Presents social epistemology and epistemic paternalism, and finally, concludes The possibility of improvement relying on individuals and indicates the possibility ofĬollective restrictions on individuals called epistemic paternalism. Of improving their systematic failures or cognitive biases. It makes an argumentative reconstruction of empirical researchĬonsiderations diagnosing human actual cognitive capacities, and inquires possibilities In the third chapter, leaves normativity behind and approaches ameliorativeĮpistemology. Shows three critics and a proposal considering the critics, again concluding skeptically. It also defines epistemic agency throughout reflective performances and In the second chapter, itĮxamines reflective agency, as well as presents virtue epistemology and performance At theĮnd, presents our proposal, with a skeptical conclusion. Shows the problem of doxastic involuntarism and some responses to the problem. sets epistemic deontologism on the ethics ofīelief discussion, constructing the emergence of doxastic epistemic agency, and it It also exposes the term’s emergence on epistemology, and a brief The first chapter, it brings considerations about the term “agency”, its origin and This thesis inquires about the term “epistemic agency”, exploring different conceptionsĪnd assessing perspectives about its use and meaning. Such polarity will be verified through Putnam’s criticism against the geo-chronometric conventionalism of Adolf Grünbaum (An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Geometry, 1963), in terms of “existential relevance” of scientific theories, even when recognising conventional elements in the definition with reference to physical quantities.
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The scientific realism will, first of all, show itself like the attitude of the phylosopher, or rather of the scientist, in front of the scientific activity: differently from the non-realistic “deductivism” which prior imposes its own methodological rules as an essential warrancy of truth, the scientific realism refuses such “feticism” of the method, sure that the scientific activity works by itself in the sphere of truth, as in inside the space defined by the relationship between a subject and something else. The paper intents to present this criticism starting with the analysis of some essays from the first volume of the Philosophical Papers, in order to bring to the “backlight” surface the actual nature of his scientific realism. On the other hand, in Mathematics, matter and method (1975), Putnam has already led a fierce criticism against the logical empiricist scientism and its deceptive and non realistic concept of science. incoherence considering the new appreciation of metaphysics of the Nineties. Just recently, in fact, in Philosophy in an Age of Science (2012), Putnam himself wanted to explicitly denounce the undeserved identification of his originary scientific realism with the scientism, as well as the illegitimacy of the resulting criticism of. The reflection of Hilary Putnam over the scientific realism endured frequent distortions inside the contemporary epistemologic debate.